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Abstract 
 
This paper develops a methodology for estimating potential cost savings from the use of market-based 
instruments (MBIs) when local emissions and abatement cost data are not available.  The paper provides 
estimates of the cost savings for a 50% reduction of particulate emissions in India’s five main industrial 
states, as well as estimates of the benefits from doing so.  The estimates are developed by applying World 
Bank particulate intensity and abatement cost factors to sectoral output data.  The estimated costs savings 
range from 26% to 169% and the benefits are many times greater than the costs even without the use of 
MBIs.  The paper concludes by commenting on the relative difficulty of implementing reductions by 
market-based instruments and conventional command-and-control regulations.  
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1.  Introduction 
In India environmental management is largely carried out at the state level.  This is true for 
natural resources such as forests and land as well as for air, water quality and solid waste pollution.  
Therefore, the focus of efforts to improve environmental stewardship has to be at the state level. 
This paper proposes and implements a methodology to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of market-
based approaches to environmental management2, and the benefits of reduced pollution.  In particular, 
using state-level data from India, we quantify potential cost savings that would result from using a 
market-based instrument (MBI) such as an emissions tax compared to command and control (CAC) 
regulations, e.g., uniform abatement by all polluting sectors.  These cost savings are juxtaposed against 
monetized benefits of improved environmental quality, particularly with respect to health effects of 
particulate air pollution.  The purpose of this exercise is to: (i) highlight the cost-effectiveness of MBIs 
vis-à-vis CAC, and (ii) illustrate the potentially large benefits that better environmental management 
could achieve.  Another application of this methodology could be to determine appropriate emission tax 
rates that would deliver a given level of emission reduction (and hence of reduction in ambient 
concentrations). 
While there exist alternative approaches for abatement of pollution, in India as in several other 
countries the policy response to regulating pollution has been through command and control (CAC) 
strategies.  These measures are essentially a set of “do’s” and “don’ts” that, inter alia, mandate ‘end-of-
pipe’ emission/discharge standards and technology choices.  Without going into the compulsions for 
adopting a CAC approach, there are a number of problems with the current regulatory regime from an 
economic point of view that are highlighted in this paper. 
                                                 
1.  Delhi School of Economics, University of Delhi, Delhi 110007, India.  Fax: +(91)-11-7667159.  E-mail: 
shreekant29@yahoo.com 
 
2.  A policy is cost-effective if it achieves a pre-specified goal at least-cost compared to alternative policies.  For example, 
the goal could be to reduce ambient concentration of particulate matter at a particular location by x percent.  This in turn 
could be translated into a target of reducing particulate emissions by y tons.  If policy A achieved this reduction at a cost 
lower than policies B and C, it would be deemed cost-effective.  It is important to note that this is not the same as the 
notion of efficiency. 
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An alternate paradigm for pollution abatement is to use economic instruments (EIs) or market-
based instruments (MBIs)3.  These instruments use the market and price mechanism to encourage firms or 
households to adopt environmentally friendly practices.  They comprise a wide range of instruments from 
traditional ones such as pollution taxes and tradable permits to input taxes, product charges and 
differential tax rates.  The common element among all MBIs is that they work through the market and 
affect the behavior of economic agents (such as firms and households) by changing the nature of 
incentives/disincentives these agents face. 
Market-based instruments (MBIs) should be an integral part of any strategy to strengthen 
environmental management at the state level.  In contrast to traditional regulatory approaches such as 
CAC, MBIs (as stated above) work through economic incentives to induce environmentally friendly 
behavior.  By allowing flexibility in attaining environmental goals (such as reduction in emissions) MBIs 
offer potential cost savings.  Thus, a given environmental target can be attained at less cost to society than 
through other regulatory approaches.  Alternately, the same amount of financial resources can potentially 
deliver greater environmental benefits with MBIs than under CAC (for further details see Gupta 2001, 
particularly Annex 1).  Empirical evidence on this from simulation studies is discussed below.  In 
addition, MBIs such as tradable emission permits if given away free (grandfathered) are assets for firms 
and create incentives for them to come forward and declare their emissions. 
  In the context of pollution control, the logic of using MBIs rests on two main premises.  First, 
“end-of-pipe” waste treatment technologies that are often mandated under CAC are only one among 
several options for pollution abatement (other options could include process modification or use of 
cleaner inputs).  MBIs, on the other hand, allow the firms flexibility in selecting among various options.  
Second, since costs of pollution abatement differ across firms, MBIs allow for the possibility of 
differential abatement across firms (with high-abatement-cost firms reducing emissions by a smaller 
amount compared to low-cost firms while still meeting overall emissions reduction targets as in CAC).  In 
other words, MBIs result in lower total pollution abatement costs as compared to CAC because they allow 
a shift in abatement from high cost to low cost abaters.  By contrast, CAC measures apply uniformly to all 
polluters such that the same environmental quality has to be achieved by polluters irrespective of their 
abatement cost structure4. 
                                                 
3.  A number of terms have been used to describe MBIs.  Some of these are "economic incentives", "economic 
instruments", "economic approaches", "market-oriented approaches", "market-based incentives", "incentive mechanisms", 
and "incentive-based mechanisms".  This paper treats them as equivalent. 
4.  Further, by creating an incentive for firms to abate more and save more (in terms of a smaller outlay on pollution taxes 
or through increased sale of tradable permits), MBIs can also spur technical change.  On the other hand, under CAC there 
is no incentive to abate beyond the required level. 
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There exist a number of simulation studies that indicate the potential cost savings of using MBIs 
instead of CAC measures to achieve the same pollution target.  These are summarized in Tables 1 and 2 
for air and water pollution control, respectively5.  In the tables, potential cost savings are shown as the 
ratio of costs under CAC (howsoever defined) to the lowest cost of meeting the same objective through an 
MBI.  A ratio of 1.0 implies the CAC regime is cost-effective and there are no potential cost savings by 
using MBIs.  It should be mentioned, however, these are simulation studies--they indicate cost savings 
that would take place if MBIs were to be used in place of CAC policies.  Cost savings realized in practice 
would depend on the extent to which actual emissions trading programs (or other MBIs) approximated the 
least-cost solution. A recent study of the most extensive emissions trading program to date, namely, that 
of sulfur dioxide trading in the United States finds that an efficient, competitive allowance market has 
developed and the cost of permits (about $186 per ton of SO2 removed) has been lower than anticipated 
(Ellerman et al. 2000). 
It should also be noted that savings in costs under MBIs occur only if costs of pollution 
abatement differ significantly across firms.  In the Indian context, given the wide variation in the nature of 
industrial activity in any given region, and in the vintage of plants, the quality of raw materials used, and 
the scale of operations, this assumption seems plausible, if MBIs were to be implemented on a spatial 
basis. 
The paper also addresses implementation issues such as monitoring (of firms and emissions) and 
enforcement (of MBIs or CAC).  Here we simply note that an appropriate legal and regulatory framework 
is a prerequisite for both MBIs and CAC.  Further, the case has not been made yet that monitoring or 
enforcement requirements are greater under MBIs than under a well functioning CAC system for instance, 
one that requires regular monitoring of emissions (also see Gupta 2002).  To begin with, there is a clear 
distinction between monitoring, i.e., ensuring that abatement activities/discharges of firms are in 
accordance with the laws and regulations and enforcement, that is, regulatory actions that make violators 
                                                 
5.  In Table 1, pollutants are categorized along two dimensions--whether they are uniformly mixed and whether they are 
assimilative.  For assimilative pollutants the capacity of the environment to absorb them is relatively large compared to 
their rate of emission, such that the pollution level in any year is independent of the amount discharged in the previous 
years.  In other words, assimilative pollutants do not accumulate over time.  The situation is the opposite for accumulative 
pollutants.  Most conventional pollutants, however (such as oxides of nitrogen and sulphur, total suspended particulates, 
and BOD), are assimilative in nature. 
 
In the case of uniformly mixed pollutants, the ambient concentration of a pollutant depends on the total amount discharged, 
but not on the spatial distribution of these discharges among the various sources.  Thus, a unit reduction in emission from 
any source within an airshed would have the same effect on ambient air quality.  An example of this would be emissions 
of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) that uniformly contribute to concentration of ozone in an airshed.  Non-uniformly 
mixed pollutants comprise air and water pollutants such as total suspended particulates, sulfur dioxide, and BOD.  In these 
cases the location of the discharge matters--all sources do not affect ambient air/water quality in the same manner.  In 
other words, damage costs from non-uniformly mixed pollutants are not uniform.  In terms of analyzing various kinds of 
pollutants the easiest category is uniformly mixed assimilative pollutants. 
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change their ways and also act as a deterrent (Russell 1992).  With respect to monitoring, the 
requirements are the same under MBIs and a CAC regime that focuses on continuing compliance in 
contrast to initial compliance (see Russell et al. (1986) for details).  As far as enforcement is concerned 
possible financial benefits under MBIs (from sale of emission permits or reduced pollution tax burden) 
could make enforcement easier than under CAC. 
The following section outlines the steps to estimate the potential cost-effectiveness of MBIs vis-
a-vis CAC.  This is followed by an application of this methodology to abatement of particulate air 
pollution for selected states in India (section 3).  Section 4 provides a brief look at the health benefits of 
reducing particulate pollution.  Implementation challenges are addressed in section 5.  The final section 
offers concluding thoughts and directions for further research. 
 
2.  Methodology 
The steps in estimating the cost-effectiveness of MBIs are briefly described: 
(i) The first step is to estimate the pollution load for each firm and industrial sector.  Since actual 
information of this nature does not exist, it is estimated by using data on pollution intensities 
(effluent/emission per unit of output) from the World Bank Industrial Pollution Projection System (IPPS) 
database. Industrial output data by sector is collected from the official Annual Survey of Industry (ASI) in 
India.  Note, pollution intensities are given by sector and thus assume that all firms within a sector are 
identical6. 
(ii) Next, calculate the cumulative cost of pollution abatement using estimates of marginal 
abatement cost (MAC) expressed in terms of US$ (1994 prices) per ton of pollutant reduced from the 
same World Bank IPPS database.  These costs, however, are reported only at the sectoral level and are 
constant.  In other words, for each sector there is only one cost figure implying that average and marginal 
cost of abatement are the same (total cost is a straight line through the origin). For particulates, MAC 
ranges from $2.43/ton for caustic soda to about $330/ton for leather.  We arrange these in ascending order 
and convert them to 1987-88 rupees/ton (Table 7). 
(iii) Finally, for a given level of total abatement, say 50 percent, calculate the ratio of total 
abatement costs under CAC and MBIs.  For CAC, this entails dividing aggregate total cost by half, 
whereas for MBIs this requires calculating the cumulative cost of abatement upto the point where 50 
percent of pollution is abated.  The application described in the next section clarifies this further. 
                                                 
6.  In effect, this implies that the variability in pollution intensities and MACs is greater across sectors than within.  This is 
a reasonable assumption.  It would, of course, be useful to have firm level data on pollution intensities and MACs (or at 
least have the data for each sector further broken down by size of firms, e.g., large, medium and small). 
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With respect to step (i) it should be noted that data on actual emissions by each source for a given 
spatial area would obviate the need to use standardized pollution intensities.  In fact, a detailed and up to 
date emissions inventory by source is an important input into better environmental management at the 
state level7.  Short of this, standardized pollution intensities could be developed, again at the state level, in 
place of the coefficients from IPPS used in the paper.  A similar observation is in order for step (ii)—
actual firm level data on marginal abatement costs would be ideal.  In the absence of actual data on 
MACs, however, it would be useful to develop estimates based on Indian data rather than IPPS 
coefficients8. 
Broadly speaking, there are two approaches to estimating MACs.  The first is a bottom up 
(engineering) approach also known as the programming approach.  Here the cost of control technologies 
and the corresponding reduction in emissions (for a specific pollutant) are estimated for each firm.  This 
approach reflects the ground reality that MACs are not smooth, twice differentiable convex curves as in 
textbooks.  These idealized representations of MAC assume that small incremental increases in abatement 
are possible.  In reality, however, abatement could be lumpy/indivisible generating a step-shaped or a 
piecewise linear MAC curve for each firm.  For instance, for a given pollutant abatement technology I 
(scrubber) could cost X Rs. and reduce emissions by A tons, whereas technology II (process 
modification) could cost Y Rs. and reduce emissions by B tons, and so on.  The point to note is that once 
a technology is picked (say technology I) it comes bundled with a (more or less) fixed amount of 
reduction in emissions.  This also means that for each of these technologies (I, II, III, and so on) marginal 
cost = average cost, hence MAC for each firm is step-shaped MAC. 
Secondly, under econometric estimation of MAC (cost function approach) an abatement cost 
function is econometrically estimated using cross-section plant level data.  The assumption is that each 
plant minimizes the cost of producing output (q) subject to its production technology and a constraint on 
emissions/effluent.  The latter is the regulatory standard facing the plant.  The decision to be made at the 
plant level is to choose labor, capital and other inputs to minimize the cost of producing output q and 
                                                 
7.  A good example of this is the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) in the United States.  TRI is a publicly available database 
that contains information on toxic chemical releases into air, water and other media and other waste management activities 
reported annually by certain covered industry groups as well as federal facilities.  See http://www.epa.gov/tri/ for details.  
Other countries that have similar emission inventories include Australia, Czech Republic, Mexico and the United 
Kingdom.  See http://www.epa.gov/tri/programs/prtrs.htm for details.  The characteristics of an ideal emissions inventory 
would be: (i) facility specific data; (ii) standardized data; (iii) chemical specific data; (iv) annual reporting; (v) public 
access to the data; (vi) mandatory reporting; (vii) limited trade secrecy; (viii) for each chemical, data on releases to air, 
water and land, and (ix) for each chemical, data on transfers of the chemical in waste. 
 
8.  This is not to suggest that IPPS data is not useful and/or appropriate.  To the contrary, given the extent to which 
industrial processes/technologies are converging globally the IPPS does provide a useful benchmark.  If Indian data on 
pollution intensities and MACs were available it would be useful to see how closely it corresponded to IPPS data.  In the 
absence of such data there is no option but to deploy a rapid assessment tool such as IPPS. 
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achieving an emission/effluent discharge rate in time period t, subject to emissions and production 
constraints. 
 
3.  An application 
As an illustration of the methodology outlined above we focus on 17 “highly polluting” industrial 
sectors as identified by the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) for implementation of pollution 
control programs (http://cpcb.nic.in/17cat/17cat.html).  These sectors appear to be the focus of regulatory 
attention and are regularly highlighted in the annual reports of CPCB and on its website. Most state 
pollution control boards (SPCBs) also take their cue from CPCB in focusing on these sectors.  In an 
exercise of this nature where the focus is on the cost-effectiveness of alternative regulatory regimes, we  
limit the analysis to these sectors.  These sectors are also major industrial sectors in terms of share of 
output and employment.  They are: (1) aluminum smelting; (2) basic drugs and pharmaceuticals; (3) 
caustic soda; (4) cement; (5) copper smelting; (6) distillery; (7) dyes and dye intermediates; (8) fertilizer; 
(9) integrated iron and steel; (10) leather; (11) oil refineries; (12) pesticide (13) petrochemical; (14) paper 
and pulp; (15) sugar; (16) thermal power plants, and (17) zinc smelting. 
Some of the categories (e.g., “leather”, “sugar”) are quite general and need to be described further 
in terms of specific processes that generate pollution.  In other words, in order to use output data from 
ASI in conjunction with pollution coefficients from IPPS, it is necessary to translate the broad CPCB 
categories into specific sectors using industrial classification systems. This issue is discussed further 
below. 
As stated earlier, emissions/effluent data is not gathered on a regular basis for most industries in 
India at the national or state level (only ambient air and water quality are monitored on a regular basis).  
SPCBs typically classify industries into broad categories based on their potential to pollute.  For instance, 
Punjab PCB classifies units as "red" (highly polluting) or as "green" (marginally/moderately polluting).  
The objective is to subject units in the former category to more frequent monitoring and inspection than 
those in the latter.  There is, however, no regular data collection of emission/effluent discharge for units in 
either category. 
Thus, the first step is to estimate the pollution load for these 17 sectors by using the Industrial 
Pollution Projection System (IPPS) developed at the World Bank.  IPPS exploits the fact that industrial 
pollution is highly affected by the scale of industrial activity and its sectoral composition.  It operates 
through sector estimates of pollution intensity (usually defined as pollution load per unit of output or 
pollution load per unit of employment).  Results from IPPS have been used in various countries where 
insufficient data on industrial pollution proved to be an impediment to setting up pollution control 
strategies and prioritization of activities, for example, Brazil, Latvia, Mexico and Vietnam.  The IPPS 
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methodology has also been used in published research such as Cole et al. (1998), Vukina et al. (1999) and 
Reinert and Roland-Holst (2001a, 2001b)9.  To our knowledge this paper is the first to apply this 
methodology to India. 
Thus, sectoral estimates of pollution intensity from IPPS are applied to data on value of output for 
the polluting sectors identified by CPCB.  This enables estimation of the pollution load at the state level 
for air pollutants such as NOx, SO2 and particulate matter, as well as water pollutants such as BOD and 
TSS.  In doing so, one has to first map the broad categories defined by CPCB (e.g., leather, sugar) into 
specific industrial activities by ISIC codes (e.g., ISIC 3231--tanneries and leather finishing or ISIC 3118--
sugar factories and refineries) that are typically used to measure output, value added, employment, etc10.  
Such a mapping is required to make the CPCB categories consistent with IPPS pollution intensities and 
marginal abatement costs (MACs) that are reported by ISIC. 
Table 3 presents data on value of output for 15 CPCB polluting industries11 and their 
corresponding ISIC codes for 5 states, namely, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh and 
Tamil Nadu12.  According to CPCB, these states have the highest number of polluting firms (Table 4a).  
Hence, the paper focuses on these 5 states. 
Value of output data for the 15 industries is from the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) 1997-98.  
ASI is the principal source of industrial statistics in India13.  Annex 1 shows the calculations used for 
arriving at the pollution load using IPPS and ASI data.  IPPS pollution intensities for 3 air pollutants 
(SO2, NO2 and TSP) and for 2 water pollutants (BOD and TSS) are reported in Table 5, whereas 
estimated pollution loads for these pollutants for the 5 states are reported in Table 6. 
The next step is to use estimates of marginal abatement cost (MAC), that is, the amount of rupees 
required to reduce pollution load by an extra ton for each of the above pollutants for the 15 polluting 
sectors.  These estimates again are from the World Bank IPPS database since this information is not yet 
available for India by sector and pollutant14.  There have been some attempts to estimate MAC for water 
                                                 
9.  For additional examples of the application of IPPS see http://www.worldbank.org/nipr/polmod.htm. 
 
10.  ISIC—International Standard Industrial Classification is the classification approved by the United Nations in 1948 for 
adoption by various countries as a framework for rearranging national classifications to facilitate international 
comparability.  It has undergone revisions from time to time and the latest version is ISIC Rev. 3 (1990) with ISIC Rev. 
3.1 in draft form.  IPPS uses ISIC Rev. 2 that dates to 1968.  See http://esa.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/ for details.  The Indian 
equivalent of ISIC is the National Industrial Classification (NIC) and NIC 1998 is identical to ISIC Rev. 3.  See 
http://www.nic.in/stat/nic_98.htm. 
 
11.  Two categories are excluded since IPPS does not have pollution intensities for thermal power plants and for 
petrochemicals ASI data is too disaggregated—over 50 compounds. 
 
12.  For some industries (such copper, aluminum and zinc smelting) the ISIC codes are the same since IPPS uses ISIC 
Rev.2 that does not have greater resolution. 
  
13.   See http://www.nic.in/stat/stat_act_t3.htm for details on ASI, the sampling frame and sampling design. 
14.  For details on estimation of MAC in IPPS see the paper by Hartman, Wheeler and Singh (1994) also available at the 
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pollution for India though none for air pollution (see Goldar et al. 2001 for references).  These studies, 
however, do not estimate MAC by sector and are of limited use for the current exercise. 
As expected, for any given pollutant the MAC figures vary by sector and can thus be arranged in 
ascending order.  This, in effect, gives us an overall MAC curve for each pollutant15.  This curve is step-
shaped and comprises a number of flat segments, each representing a sector (see Figure 1 for a stylized 
illustration of what such a curve would look like).  Table 7 presents IPPS estimates of abatement costs for 
particulates (TSP) by sector, converted to 1987-88 rupees.  As stated earlier, implicit here is the 
assumption that firms within a sector are similar in terms of MAC.  While this may seem unrealistic, the 
important thing to keep in mind is that within a particular sector firms roughly produce the same kind of 
pollutants and use the same processes for abatement.  To put it differently, it is likely that differences in 
MAC between firms within a sector are less as compared to differences in MAC across (very dissimilar) 
sectors. 
 In order to reduce pollution load of any given pollutant, a CAC regime would require uniform 
abatement across all sectors.  For example, if the goal were to reduce the total particulate load by x 
percent, under a CAC regime all sectors emitting particulates would have to reduce their emissions by x 
percent (though their abatement costs differ greatly).  On the other hand, with a MBI such as a tax on 
particulate emissions, low cost firms/sectors would do most of the abating (rather than paying the tax) 
whereas the high cost firms/sectors would pay the tax rather than abate. 
The above methodology is applied to particulate pollution (also known as total suspended 
particulate or TSP) for each of the 5 states. Here, we compute the total abatement costs under CAC for a 
50 percent reduction in the pollution load and compare it with the cost that would result under an 
emissions tax (Table 8).  The reason for focusing on particulates in the illustration is that they are 
considered to be the most serious pollutant from a human health perspective in India (Kandlikar and 
Ramachandran 2000). 
In Table 8, for each of the 5 states the 15 polluting sectors are listed in ascending order by unit 
abatement cost (rupees per ton of TSP abated).  Cumulative TSP load abated and cumulative abatement 
cost for each state are shown in columns 5 and 7, respectively.  For example, for the state of Maharashtra, 
total TSP load from all sectors is 109,837 tons, whereas the cumulative abatement cost is 61.3 million 
rupees.  Thus, under CAC if each sector were to reduce TSP load by 50 percent (uniform abatement), 
54,918 tons of TSP would be abated at a cost of approximately 30.7 million rupees (half of 61.3 million). 
                                                                                                                                                             
World Bank NIPR website. 
 
15.  The MAC curve plots the amount of pollution abated on the horizontal axis and the unit cost of abatement on the 
vertical axis.  Alternately, the horizontal axis can depict the amount of pollution generated in which case the amount of 
abatement is read from right to left on the x-axis. 
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On the other hand, with an MBI such as an emissions tax set exactly at Rs. 208.52 per ton of TSP, 
all caustic soda firms would abate completely whereas in the cement sector firms would be indifferent 
between paying the tax and abating.  In any event, abatement would occur only in caustic soda and 
cement--for all other sectors, marginal abatement costs would be higher than the emissions tax, and they 
would then simply pay the tax. 
Given the indifference of firms in the cement sector to abate/pay tax, they are apportioned 
between the two options such that the cost of 50 percent (cumulative) abatement can be read off the table 
(see cell with thick black border in final column of Table 8).  Thus, a total of 54,918 tons of TSP would 
be abated for a total cost of 11.4 million rupees.  Finally, the ratio of CAC (uniform abatement) to MBI 
(least cost) for a 50 percent reduction in TSP for Maharashtra is calculated at 2.6916.  A similar exercise is 
carried for the other four states as well.  The results are summarized in Table 9 where the ratio is greater 
than one for all states, implying thereby the need to take into account the variability in abatement costs 
across sectors. 
It is important to note that given the step-shaped nature of the aggregate MAC curve for each 
state, corner solutions result.  That is, firms in any given sector choose between full or zero abatement.  
For example, in Maharashtra with an emissions tax of Rs. 209 per ton the caustic soda and cement sectors 
would choose to reduce emissions to zero rather than pay the tax, whereas all other sectors would not 
abate at all17.  Admittedly, this is a stylized description of the real world where there are a multitude of 
firms with varying MACs, such that the MAC curve for each sector has a smooth convex shape.  
Nevertheless, we believe this is still useful for illustrating the issue of CAC versus MBIs, albeit in an 
approximate manner.  More satisfactory exercises have been carried out using detailed firm-level data for 
China.  For instance, Dasgupta et al. (2001) and Cao et al. (1998) use similar methodology to estimate 
sectoral MACs for various water and/or air pollutants for 5 to 6 industrial sectors in China.  They find 
substantial variation in MAC within sector between small, medium and large facilities and across sectors. 
 
4.  Estimating the environmental benefits of MBIs 
The ultimate objective (or benefit) of regulating pollution whether through CAC or MBIs (such as 
emission taxes), is improved environmental quality.  Specifically, the environmental benefits considered 
in this paper are health benefits of a reduction in particulate concentrations as a consequence of (MBI- or 
CAC-induced) reduction in TSP load.  As stated earlier, the reason for focusing on air pollution from 
                                                 
16.  That is, rupees [0.5(61,335,801)] divided by rupees 11,409,999.  Also note that with an emissions tax set at Rs. 
209/ton, the amount of abatement (65,951 tons) is more than 50 percent—it is in fact 60 percent.  
 
17.  Also, as stated earlier if the tax rate were exactly Rs. 208.52 firms in the cement sector would be indifferent between 
abatement and paying the tax. 
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particulates is that they constitute a serious health problem.  Some researchers have argued “particulate 
matter (PM) is the major cause of human mortality and morbidity from air pollution” (Kandlikar and 
Ramachandran 2000, p. 630).  According to USEPA even in the United States (which on average has 
much lower particulate concentrations than India) there are 20,000-100,000 deaths annually due to 
particulate pollution. 
In this context, it is important to note that the health impacts of the pollutants discussed above 
occur in terms of their ambient concentrations and not in terms of the pollution load.  It is difficult to go 
from the latter to the former for non-uniformly dispersed pollutants without knowledge of their dispersion 
characteristics that vary across space and time.  Nevertheless, as a first approximation we assume a x 
percent reduction in particulate load leads to an equivalent reduction in the ambient concentration of that 
pollutant18.  In defense of this assumption it should be pointed out that the current regulatory regime in 
India does not make any connection what-so-ever between ambient environmental quality standards (such 
as NAAQS) and source specific discharge standards, and that this is a first step in that direction.  Further, 
in India source-specific standards are typically specified in terms of maximum rates of discharge and/or 
maximum allowable concentration.  Thus, there is no cap on total emissions from any particular source, 
let alone this cap being derived from an aggregate regional cap19.  In effect then even a rough 
approximation that attempts to translate source-specific reductions into ambient concentrations, is a step 
in the right direction. 
Based on the assumption in the preceding paragraph, we estimate the extent to which mortality 
and morbidity figures would be reduced if TSP (particulate) loads were reduced and what the 
corresponding monetary benefits would be20.  Excess mortality and morbidity due to elevated 
concentrations of pollutants in air and water (i.e., air and water pollution) using Indian data has been 
estimated by Brandon and Hommann (1995) and Cropper et al. (1997).  Here, we draw on the estimates 
of Brandon and Hommann (henceforth B-H) who examine air quality in 36 Indian cities.  Of these, 10 
cities are in the 5 states that are being considering in the paper, namely, Mumbai, Nagpur and Pune (all in 
Maharshtra), Ahmedabad and Surat (Gujarat), Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh), Chennai (Tamil Nadu), and 
Agra, Kanpur and Varanasi (Uttar Pradesh).  In particular, B-H estimate the reductions in mortality and 
morbidity that would occur if ambient particulate concentrations in these 36 cities were reduced to the 
                                                 
18.  This approach is similar to what was used in the early days of regulation in countries such as the United States where 
State Implementation Plans (SIPs) were developed along these lines to achieve environmental goals. 
 
19.  A typical example of source specific discharge standards is shown in Table 10 that lists effluent/emission standards 
for thermal power plants in India.  The last row in the table stipulates standards for air emissions.  Note that the limits on 
particulate matter emissions are in terms of concentration and not the total amount of particulates a plant can emit. 
  
20.   Thus, a 50 percent reduction in particulate emissions would lead to a 50 percent reduction in ambient concentrations 
as well. 
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WHO annual average standard.  The mortality benefits are about 40,300 premature deaths avoided which 
translates into a monetary value of $170 - $1,615 million21.  From this figure, corresponding figures for 
the 10 cities that are of interest to us are separated out and grouped by state (Table 11).  Thus, we see that 
premature deaths annually due to air pollution range from 768 in Andhra Pradesh to 5,974 in Maharashtra 
with a corresponding large variation in monetary values as well. 
Given the high levels of particulates in Indian cities it could be the case that even a 50 percent 
reduction in ambient concentrations (based on a 50% reduction in particulate emissions) may not be 
enough to achieve WHO standards.  Thus, it could be argued that the B-H estimates of lives saved is not 
applicable. However, at the same time there are other urban agglomerations in these 5 states where health 
benefits of reduced particulate emissions would also accrue.  At the same time, the spatial dispersion of 
the polluting sectors within a state relative to the distribution of population is not known22.  Thus, the 
monetary values in Table 9 are a very rough approximation of the gains from reductions in particulate 
emissions discussed in section 3.  Nevertheless, the values serve to fix in mind the rather large health 
benefits of reducing air pollution, which in turn is largely particulate pollution. 
 
5. Issues of implementation with respect to MBIs 
 A discussion of MBIs in the Indian context is incomplete without reference to problems of 
monitoring and enforcement that were briefly mentioned in the introduction. In this context, the question 
to ask is “given the growing number of MBIs that are being used by countries around the world is India is 
so different that none of the country experiences can be replicated here?”  And if so, what are these 
differences?  In this context, note in particular the experience of China, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, 
and other developing countries including the formerly planned economies of Europe.  Many of these 
countries have (or had until recently), problems similar to those that are cited in the Indian context against 
the use of MBIs: imperfectly functioning markets, problems of monitoring and enforcing standards (due 
to a bloated and inefficient bureaucracy, shortage of resources, large number of micro and small-scale 
firms), and so on.  In our view, while these difficulties are real and cannot be ignored, it is also true that 
the Indian situation is amenable to the implementation of well-designed MBIs. 
We agree that implementation of MBIs has certain prerequisites like well-functioning markets, 
information on the types of abatement technology available and its cost (O'Connor 1995).  In addition, the 
collection of an emissions charge depends on a reasonably effective tax administration and monitoring of 
                                                 
21.  Three major cities account for 44% of total premature deaths—Delhi (19%), Calcutta (14%), and Mumbai (11%).  For 
value of a statistical life (VSL), B-H use a range with the lower bound given by the human capital approach (discounted 
value of a ten-year wage stream) at $4,208/life, whereas the upper bound (calculated by scaling down US VSL estimates) 
comes to $40,017/life. 
 
22.  In effect within a state we have largely ignored the spatial dimension. 
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actual emissions.  Tradable permit schemes require administrative machinery for issuing permits, tracking 
trades, and monitoring the actual emissions.  Since the development of these capabilities is crucial for the 
effectiveness of the instruments, MBIs cannot be considered as a short cut to pollution control.  In other 
words, MBIs have institutional requirements just like regulatory measures.  The important point, 
however, is that these requirements are not greater for MBIs. 
     In this section we focus specifically on problems of monitoring and enforcement23.  It is often 
claimed that since the effectiveness of MBIs depends crucially on the ability to successfully monitor 
discharges, till such time as the capability to monitor plant-level emissions/effluents is in place in India, it 
is not feasible to introduce MBIs.  In response, it can be argued: 
• Monitoring of discharges is required under a properly functioning command and control 
regime as well.  The emphasis on the phrase "properly functioning" is deliberate: the 
current practice of merely confirming that pollution abatement equipment is installed and 
working is not enough24.  This "checklist" approach to ensuring compliance does not 
provide much information about actual emissions/effluents.  Therefore, monitoring of 
discharges is not a problem unique to MBIs. 
 In cases where direct monitoring of discharges is not possible (or is expensive), both theory and 
practice suggest several "second best" alternatives.  To begin with, there are a number of ways to 
indirectly estimate these discharges.  For instance: 
• Data on inputs and/or output can be used to estimate emissions/effluents as long as the 
production function relationship between these variables is known (as we have done by 
applying IPPS).  All that is required to implement these methods is detailed data on 
output in physical units or in monetary values.  Of course, the more disaggregated the 
data, the more fine-tuned are the pollution coefficients, and the more accurate are the 
estimates of pollution load. 
• The example of Sweden shows that it is possible to promote a system of self-monitoring 
among large firms.  In this case standard emission rates were used for determining NOx 
charges for firms whenever emissions were not measurable.  These rates were greater 
than the average actual emissions, and consequently encouraged the installation of 
measurement equipment by firms (OECD 1994, p. 59).  This could be a feasible 
monitoring mechanism for large plants in India. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
23.  For a general discussion of barriers to implementation of MBIs in India, see Gupta (2002). 
 
24.  In some cases, all that is required is that pollution abatement equipment is installed, not even whether it is operating 
properly.  This is particularly true when courts are deciding whether to shut down polluting units. 
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 If it is not possible at all to estimate emissions/effluents (even indirectly), the following options 
are still available to regulators: 
• They could use indirect instruments aimed at the outputs and inputs of the polluting 
industry or substitutes and complements to its outputs.  For example, a tax on leather 
products would be an indirect method of addressing pollution from tanneries.  These 
indirect instruments should be fine tuned to the extent possible, based on the pollution 
potential of different products/processes.  For instance, a presumptive emissions tax on 
fuels should be differentiated by the emissions coefficients in different industries--thus, 
the cement industry which does not discharge the sulfur of its fuels, should ideally be 
refunded presumptive sulfur taxes on fuels (Eskeland and Jimenez, 1992). 
       Finally, if emissions are fully determined by the consumption of one good, then that good could 
be taxed (e.g., carbon taxes based on the carbon content of fuels).  By the same token, substitutes to the 
polluting good could be subsidized (e.g., mass transit if private vehicles are a cause of urban air 
pollution), and complements to the polluting good could be taxed (such as parking space). 
 
6.  Conclusions 
This exercise is a useful input into a framework for evaluation and selection of MBIs.  By pulling 
together various strands of the analysis and using Indian data we are able to illustrate the environmental 
benefits and cost savings of MBIs.  Despite the assumptions and approximations made in the process, this 
analysis can better inform policy-making for environmental management at the state level.  In particular, 
we have demonstrated the use of existing databases (IPPS): (i) as a rapid assessment tool to arrive at 
source-specific/sectoral emission inventories, and (ii) to estimate the cost of reducing emissions through 
MBIs and CAC.  In addition, we have shown how this approach can be used to demonstrate the cost-
effectiveness of MBIs vis-à-vis CAC. 
These estimates are then juxtaposed against monetary values of the health benefits of reducing 
particulate pollution.  In the absence of spatial data on emissions and of dispersion characteristics a 
number of heroic assumptions have to be made.  Nevertheless, since such an analysis has not been 
attempted before for India there is a novelty to the exercise.  It can and should be repeated as and when 
better information and data becomes available.  In particular, it would be useful to estimate firm level 
marginal abatement costs either through bottom up engineering estimates or through econometric 
estimation. 
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Figure 1.  Shape of marginal abatement cost curve with linear total cost 
 
y axis is in rupees.  Values of abatement costs (Rs./ton) for the 15 sectors in the IPPS database are arranged in 
ascending order on the vertical axis.  The x axis is in terms of a specific pollutant (TSP in our illustration).  It 
shows the amount of pollution generated by each sector, i.e., the width of the step. 
 
 
R
up
ee
s 
abatement 
 18 
 
  Table 1.  Empirical studies of air pollution control 
Study and Year Pollutants Covered Geographic Area CAC benchmark Assumed pollutant type Ratio of CAC to least cost 
 
Atkinson and Lewis (1974) 
 
Particulates 
 
St. Louis Metropolitan Area 
 
SIP regulations 
 
Nonuniformly  
mixed 
 
     6.00 
 
Palmer, Mooz, Quinn, and Wolf (1980) 
 
Chlorofluorocarbon 
emissions from nonaerosol 
applications 
 
United States 
 
Proposed emissions standards
 
Uniformly mixed 
accumulative 
 
     1.96 
 
Roach, et al. (1981) 
 
Sulfur dioxide 
 
Four Corners in Utah, 
Colorado, Arizona and New 
Mexico 
 
SIP regulations 
 
Nonuniformly 
mixed 
 
4.25 
 
Hahn and Noll (1982) 
 
Sulfates 
 
Los Angeles 
 
California emission standards
 
Nonuniformly 
mixed 
 
     1.07 
 
Atkinson (1983) 
 
Sulfur dioxide 
 
Cleveland 
 
 
 
Nonuniformly 
mixed 
 
About 1.5 
 
Harrison (1983) 
 
Airport noise 
 
United States 
 
Mandatory retrofit 
 
Uniformly mixed 
 
      1.72 
 
 
Seskin, Anderson & Reid (1983) 
 
Nitrogen dioxide 
 
Chicago 
 
Proposed RACT regulations 
 
Nonuniformly 
mixed 
 
    14.40 
 
Maloney and Yandle (1984) 
 
Hydrocarbons 
 
All domestic Du Pont plants 
 
Uniform percentage 
reduction 
 
Uniformly mixed 
 
      4.15 
 
McGartland (1984) 
 
Particulate 
 
Baltimore 
 
SIP regulations 
 
Nonuniformly 
mixed 
 
      4.18 
 
Spofford (1984) 
 
Sulfur dioxide 
 
Lower Delaware Valley 
 
Uniform percentage 
reduction 
 
Nonuniformly 
mixed 
 
      1.78 
 
continued 
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 Table 1 continued.  Empirical studies of air pollution control 
Study and Year Pollutants Covered Geographic Area CAC benchmark Assumed pollutant type Ratio of CAC to least cost 
 
Spofford (1984) 
 
Particulates 
 
Lower Delaware 
Valley 
 
Uniform percentage 
reduction 
 
Nonuniformly 
mixed 
 
     22.00 
 
Krupnick (1986) 
 
Nitrogen dioxide 
 
Baltimore 
 
Proposed RACT 
regulations 
 
Nonuniformly 
mixed 
 
      5.9 
 
Welsch (1988) 
 
Sulfur dioxide 
 
United Kingdom 
 
 
 
Nonuniformly 
mixed 
 
1.4-2.5 
 
Oates, et al. 
(1989) 
 
TSP 
 
Baltimore  
 
Equal proportional 
treatment 
 
Nonuniformly 
mixed 
 
4.0 at 90 µg/m3 
 
SCAQMD 
(1992) 
 
Reactive Organic Gases/Nitrogen 
dioxide 
 
Southern California 
 
Best available control 
technology 
 
Nonuniformly 
mixed 
 
1.5 in 1994 
 
 
TSP  = Total Suspended Particulates 
SCAQMD = South Coast Air Quality Management District 
SIP  = State Implementation Plan (strategy by a state in the US to meet federal environmental standards) 
RACT  = Reasonably Available Control Technologies, a set of standards imposed on existing sources in non attainment areas 
 
Source:  Tietenberg (1985), USEPA (1992) and World Bank (1992) 
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 Table 2.  Empirical studies of water pollution control 
Study and Year Pollutants Covered Geographic Area CAC benchmark DO target (mg/litre)
Ratio of CAC cost to 
least cost 
 
Johnson (1967) 
 
Biochemical oxygen demand 
 
Delaware Estuary - 86-mile reach 
 
Equal proportional 
treatment 
 
    2.0
    3.0
    4.0
 
    3.13 
    1.62 
    1.43 
 
O'Neil (1980) 
 
Biochemical oxygen demand 
 
20-mile segment of Lower Fox River in 
Wisconsin 
 
Equal proportional 
treatment 
 
    2.0
    4.0
    6.2
    7.9
 
    2.29 
    1.71 
    1.45 
    1.38 
 
Eheart, Brill, and Lyon (1983) 
 
Biochemical oxygen demand 
 
Willamette River in Oregon 
 
Equal proportional 
treatment 
 
    4.8
    7.5
 
    1.12 
    1.19 
 
 
 
 
 
Delaware Estuary in Penn., Delaware, 
and New Jersey 
 
Equal proportional 
treatment 
 
    3.0
    3.6
 
    3.00 
    2.92 
 
 
 
 
 
Upper Hudson River in New York 
 
Equal proportional 
treatment 
 
    5.1
    5.9
 
    1.54 
    1.62 
 
 
 
 
 
Mohawk River in New York 
 
Equal proportional 
treatment 
 
    6.8
 
    1.22 
 
Opaluch and Kashmanian (1985) 
 
Heavy metals 
 
Rhode Island Jewelry Industry 
 
Technology-based 
standards 
  
    1.8 
 
 
DO = Dissolved oxygen--higher DO targets indicate higher water quality 
 
Source:  Tietenberg (1985) and USEPA (1992) 
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Table 3. Value of output 1997-98 (rupees thousand at 1987-88 prices)
CPCB category ISIC Code Four digit ISIC description Maharashtra Gujarat Andhra Pradesh Tamil Nadu Uttar Pradesh
Aluminium smelter 3720 Nonferrous metals 155462 0 0 0 0
Basic drugs and pharmaceuticals 3522 Drugs and medicines 4790457 971344 823978 2061920 287225
Caustic soda 3511 Industrial chemicals except fertilizer 373848 854805 574824 599646 243317
Cement 3692 Cement, lime, and plaster 3017815 4400902 3586549 5599154 193913
Copper smelter 3720 Nonferrous metals 58356 0 53313 0 0
Distilleries 3131 Distilled spirits 893477 0 276006 1956470 895107
Dyes and dye intermediates 3211 Spinning, weaving and finishing textiles 2231267 6497946 0 57092 1934
Fertiliser 3512 Fertilizers and pesticides 8244055 5827671 2766260 1775221 13605411
Integrated iron and steel 3710 Iron and steel 3665310 1208602 3775821 462068 517631
Leather 3231 Tanneries and leather finishing 17234 41141 3083 4054542 1146688
Oil refineries 3530 Petroleum refineries 28060249 5756601 2209561 3714842 7964682
Pesticides 3512 Fertilizers and pesticides 4011664 6133013 1924831 796369 140420
Pulp and paper 3411 Pulp, paper, and paperboard 706653 832058 1401817 4225917 1510495
Sugar 3118 Sugar factories and refineries 15913434 4424972 4541418 6081343 21644261
Zinc smelter 3720 Nonferrous metals 76604 0 744848 0 6195
Source: Annual Survey of Industries, Central Statistical Organisation, New Delhi
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Table 4a. Statewise distribution of polluting industries Table 4b. Distribution of industries by category
Andhra Pradesh 173 Aluminium smelter 7
Arunachal Pradesh 0 Caustic soda 25
Assam 15 Cement 116
Bihar 62 Copper smelter 2
Goa 6 Distilleries 177
Gujarat 177 Dyes and dye intermediates 64
Haryana 43 Fertiliser 110
Himachal Pradesh 9 Integrated iron and steel 8
Jammu and Kashmir 8 Leather 70
Karnataka 85 Pesticide 71
Kerala 28 Petrochemicals 49
Madhya Pradesh 78 Basic drugs and pharmaceuticals 251
Maharashtra 335 Pulp and paper 96
Manipur 0 Oil refineries 12
Meghalaya 1 Sugar 392
Mizoram 0 Thermal power plants 97
Nagaland 0 Zinc smelter 4
Orissa 23
Punjab 45 Total 1551
Rajasthan 49
Sikkim 1
Tamil Nadu 119
Tripura 0
Uttar Pradesh 224
West Bengal 58
Union Territories (UT):
Andman & Nicobar  0
Chandigarh 1
Daman & Diu 0
Dadra & Nagar Haveli 0
Delhi 5
Lakshadweep 0
Pondichery 6
otal 1551
  
 
       Table 5.  IPPS pollution intensities for air and water pollutants
kilograms/thousand rupees (1987-88 rupees)
CPCB category ISIC Four Digit ISIC Description SO2 NO2 TSP BOD TSS
Aluminium smelter 3720 Nonferrous metals 1.352 0.044 0.114 0.104 1.498
Basic drugs and pharmaceuticals 3522 Drugs and medicines 0.064 0.027 0.012 0.002 0.536
Caustic soda 3511 Industrial chemicals except fertilizer 0.408 0.303 0.066 0.140 0.216
Cement 3692 Cement, lime, and plaster 4.502 2.090 2.177 0.000 0.091
Copper smelter 3720 Nonferrous metals 1.352 0.044 0.114 0.104 1.498
Distilleries 3131 Distilled spirits 0.136 0.047 0.011 0.191 0.343
Dyes and dye intermediates 3211 Spinning, weaving and finishing textiles 0.085 0.117 0.015 0.003 0.005
Fertiliser 3512 Fertilizers and pesticides 0.039 0.037 0.011 0.002 0.305
Integrated iron and steel 3710 Iron and steel 0.625 0.272 0.145 0.000 6.812
Leather 3231 Tanneries and leather finishing 0.045 0.012 0.005 0.021 0.040
Oil refineries 3530 Petroleum refineries 0.443 0.255 0.039 0.006 0.028
Pesticides 3512 Fertilizers and pesticides 0.039 0.037 0.011 0.002 0.305
Pulp and paper 3411 Pulp, paper, and paperboard 0.895 0.467 0.176 0.481 1.634
Sugar 3118 Sugar factories and refineries 0.225 0.216 0.149 0.075 0.107
Zinc smelter 3720 Non ferrous metals 1.352 0.044 0.114 0.104 1.498
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 Table 6.  E stim ated pollution load by state, 1997-98 (kilogram s)
M aharashtra
C PC B category ISIC Four digit ISIC  description SO 2 N O 2 T SP B O D T SS
A lum inium  sm elter 3720 N onferrous m etals 210179 6847 17654 16115 232938
Basic drugs and pharm aceuticals 3522 D rugs and m edicines 305844 129879 57817 10238 2566530
Caustic soda 3511 Industrial chem icals except fertilizer 152442 113233 24496 52168 80636
Cem ent 3692 C em ent, lim e, and plaster 13585960 6308084 6570643 125 273178
Copper sm elter 3720 N onferrous m etals 78894 2570 6627 6049 87438
D istilleries 3131 D istilled spirits 121495 42228 10158 170380 306230
D yes and dye interm ediates 3211 Spinning, w eaving and finishing textile 189054 260866 33799 7664 11901
Fertiliser 3512 Fertilizers and pesticides 318974 307150 88540 12944 2518507
Integrated iron and steel 3710 Iron and steel 2290984 995149 530849 1695 24969495
Leather 3231 Tanneries and leather finishing 783 207 95 366 692
O il refineries 3530 Petroleum  refineries 12431460 7151231 1096489 155374 779784
Pesticides 3512 Fertilizers and pesticides 155217 149463 43085 6298 1225538
Pulp and paper 3411 Pulp, paper, and paperboard 632486 330000 124297 339947 1154589
Sugar 3118 Sugar factories and refineries 3578487 3435415 2370442 1186184 1700711
Zinc sm elter 3720 N onferrous m etals 103565 3374 8699 7940 114780
G ujarat
C PC B category ISIC Four digit ISIC  description SO 2 N O 2 T SP B O D T SS
A lum inium  sm elter 3720 N onferrous m etals 0 0 0 0 0
Basic drugs and pharm aceuticals 3522 D rugs and m edicines 62015 26335 11723 2076 520406
Caustic soda 3511 Industrial chem icals except fertilizer 348559 258907 56010 119283 184375
Cem ent 3692 C em ent, lim e, and plaster 19812509 9199127 9582020 182 398378
Copper sm elter 3720 N onferrous m etals 0 0 0 0 0
D istilleries 3131 D istilled spirits 0 0 0 0 0
D yes and dye interm ediates 3211 Spinning, w eaving and finishing textile 550567 759700 98429 22318 34659
Fertiliser 3512 Fertilizers and pesticides 225481 217122 62588 9150 1780317
Integrated iron and steel 3710 Iron and steel 755431 328141 175042 559 8233459
Leather 3231 Tanneries and leather finishing 1870 494 226 874 1651
O il refineries 3530 Petroleum  refineries 2550332 1467085 224946 31875 159974
Pesticides 3512 Fertilizers and pesticides 237295 228498 65868 9629 1873597
Pulp and paper 3411 Pulp, paper, and paperboard 744730 388564 146355 400276 1359488
Sugar 3118 Sugar factories and refineries 995053 955269 659137 329836 472909
Zinc sm elter 3720 N onferrous m etals 0 0 0 0 0
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 Table 6 continued Andhra Pradesh
CPCB category ISIC Four digit ISIC description SO 2 NO 2 TSP BO D TSS
Alum inium  sm elter 3720 Nonferrous m etals 0 0 0 0 0
Basic drugs and pharm aceuticals 3522 Drugs and m edicines 52606 22340 9945 1761 441454
Caustic soda 3511 Industrial chem icals except fertilizer 234393 174105 37665 80214 123985
Cem ent 3692 Cem ent, lim e, and plaster 16146355 7496898 7808940 148 324661
Copper sm elter 3720 Nonferrous m etals 72077 2348 6054 5526 79883
Distilleries 3131 Distilled spirits 37531 13045 3138 52633 94598
Dyes and dye interm ediates 3211 Spinning, weaving and finishing textile 0 0 0 0 0
Fertiliser 3512 Fertilizers and pesticides 107031 103063 29709 4343 845075
Integrated iron and steel 3710 Iron and steel 2360059 1025153 546854 1746 25722340
Leather 3231 Tanneries and leather finishing 140 37 17 66 124
Oil refineries 3530 Petroleum  refineries 978896 563113 86341 12235 61403
Pesticides 3512 Fertilizers and pesticides 74474 71714 20672 3022 588024
Pulp and paper 3411 Pulp, paper, and paperboard 1254690 654636 246573 674367 2290408
Sugar 3118 Sugar factories and refineries 1021238 980408 676483 338516 485353
Zinc sm elter 3720 Nonferrous m etals 1007005 32806 84582 77208 1116052
Tamil Nadu
CPCB category ISIC Four digit ISIC description SO 2 NO 2 TSP BO D TSS
Alum inium  sm elter 3720 Nonferrous m etals 0 0 0 0 0
Basic drugs and pharm aceuticals 3522 Drugs and m edicines 131642 55903 24886 4407 1104692
Caustic soda 3511 Industrial chem icals except fertilizer 244514 181624 39291 83677 129339
Cem ent 3692 Cem ent, lim e, and plaster 25206942 11703811 12190955 231 506846
Copper sm elter 3720 Nonferrous m etals 0 0 0 0 0
Distilleries 3131 Distilled spirits 266040 92467 22244 373086 670559
Dyes and dye interm ediates 3211 Spinning, weaving and finishing textile 4837 6675 865 196 305
Fertiliser 3512 Fertilizers and pesticides 68686 66140 19066 2787 542319
Integrated iron and steel 3710 Iron and steel 288813 125454 66922 214 3147782
Leather 3231 Tanneries and leather finishing 184251 48651 22269 86153 162693
Oil refineries 3530 Petroleum  refineries 1645777 946737 145162 20570 103234
Pesticides 3512 Fertilizers and pesticides 30813 29670 8553 1250 243286
Pulp and paper 3411 Pulp, paper, and paperboard 3782389 1973465 743320 2032948 6904665
Sugar 3118 Sugar factories and refineries 1367525 1312849 905868 453302 649929
Zinc sm elter 3720 Nonferrous m etals 0 0 0 0 0
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 Table 6 continued Uttar Pradesh
CPCB category ISIC Four digit ISIC description SO2 NO2 TSP BOD TSS
Aluminium smelter 3720 Nonferrous metals 0 0 0 0 0
Basic drugs and pharmaceuticals 3522 Drugs and medicines 18338 7787 3467 614 153883
Caustic soda 3511 Industrial chemicals except fertilizer 99216 73697 15943 33954 52482
Cement 3692 Cement, lime, and plaster 872981 405333 422204 8 17553
Copper smelter 3720 Nonferrous metals 0 0 0 0 0
Distilleries 3131 Distilled spirits 121716 42305 10177 170691 306788
Dyes and dye intermediates 3211 Spinning, weaving and finishing textile 164 226 29 7 10
Fertiliser 3512 Fertilizers and pesticides 526413 506898 146120 21361 4156368
Integrated iron and steel 3710 Iron and steel 323543 140539 74969 239 3526298
Leather 3231 Tanneries and leather finishing 52109 13759 6298 24365 46012
Oil refineries 3530 Petroleum refineries 3528573 2029821 311230 44102 221335
Pesticides 3512 Fertilizers and pesticides 5433 5232 1508 220 42897
Pulp and paper 3411 Pulp, paper, and paperboard 1351962 705388 265689 726649 2467976
Sugar 3118 Sugar factories and refineries 4867191 4672594 3224097 1613359 2313180
Zinc smelter 3720 Nonferrous metals 8375 273 703 642 9282
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           Table 7.  Abatement costs for particulates (TSP)
CPCB category ISIC code (1987-88 Rupees/ton) 
Caustic soda 3511 38.90 
Cement 3692 
Oil refineries 3530 376.85 
Pulp and paper 3411 653.32 
Sugar 3118 
Fertiliser 3512 
Pesticides 3512 
Integrated iron and steel 3710 2690.90 
Distilleries 3131 
Aluminium smelter 3720 3197.99 
Copper smelter 3720 3197.99 
Zinc smelter 3720 3197.99 
Dyes and dye intermediates 3211 3909.73 
Basic drugs and pharmaceuticals 3522 4177.00 
Leather 3231 
208.52 
922.04 
1106.67 
1106.67 
2828.73 
5286.25 
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T a b le  8 .  C u m u la t iv e  a b a t e m e n t  c o s t  f o r  p a r t ic u la t e s  ( T S P )
M a h a r a s h t r a
A b a t e m e n t  c o s t  f o r  T S P C u m u la t iv e T o t a l  a b a t e m e n t C u m u la t iv e  a b a t e m e n t
C P C B  c a t e g o r y I S I C ( R u p e e s /t o n ) T S P  lo a d  ( k i lo g r a m s ) T S P  lo a d  ( to n s ) c o s t  ( R u p e e s ) c o s t  ( R u p e e s )
C a u s t ic  s o d a 3 5 1 1 3 8 .9 0 2 4 4 9 6 2 4 5 9 5 2 8 9 5 2 8
C e m e n t  ( u p to  5 0 %  c u m u la t iv e  a b a te m e n t) 3 6 9 2 2 0 8 .5 2 5 4 6 7 3 5 0 5 4 9 1 8 1 1 4 0 0 4 7 1 1 1 4 0 9 9 9 9
C e m e n t  ( b e y o n d  5 0 %  c u m u la t iv e  a b a te m e n t) 3 6 9 2 2 0 8 .5 2 1 1 0 3 2 9 3 6 5 9 5 1 2 3 0 0 5 7 7 1 3 7 1 0 5 7 6
O il  r e f in e r ie s 3 5 3 0 3 7 6 .8 5 1 0 9 6 4 8 9 7 6 9 1 6 4 1 3 2 1 3 7 1 7 8 4 2 7 1 4
P u lp  a n d  p a p e r 3 4 1 1 6 5 3 .3 2 1 2 4 2 9 7 7 8 1 5 9 8 1 2 0 5 4 1 8 6 5 4 7 6 7
S u g a r 3 1 1 8 9 2 2 .0 4 2 3 7 0 4 4 2 1 0 1 8 6 4 2 1 8 5 6 3 1 5 4 0 5 1 1 0 8 2
F e r t i l i s e r 3 5 1 2 1 1 0 6 .6 7 8 8 5 4 0 1 0 2 7 4 9 9 7 9 8 4 3 4 1 4 9 0 9 2 5
P e s t ic id e s 3 5 1 2 1 1 0 6 .6 7 4 3 0 8 5 1 0 3 1 8 0 4 7 6 8 0 4 4 1 9 6 7 7 3 0
In te g r a te d  i r o n  a n d  s te e l 3 7 1 0 2 6 9 0 .9 0 5 3 0 8 4 9 1 0 8 4 8 8 1 4 2 8 4 5 9 5 5 6 2 5 2 3 2 5
D is t i l l e r i e s 3 1 3 1 2 8 2 8 .7 3 1 0 1 5 8 1 0 8 5 9 0 2 8 7 3 5 4 5 6 5 3 9 6 7 9
A lu m in iu m  s m e l te r 3 7 2 0 3 1 9 7 .9 9 1 7 6 5 4 1 0 8 7 6 7 5 6 4 5 6 0 5 7 1 0 4 2 3 9
C o p p e r  s m e l te r 3 7 2 0 3 1 9 7 .9 9 6 6 2 7 1 0 8 8 3 3 2 1 1 9 1 8 5 7 3 1 6 1 5 6
Z in c  s m e l te r 3 7 2 0 3 1 9 7 .9 9 8 6 9 9 1 0 8 9 2 0 2 7 8 1 8 6 5 7 5 9 4 3 4 3
D y e s  a n d  d y e  in te r m e d ia te s 3 2 1 1 3 9 0 9 .7 3 3 3 7 9 9 1 0 9 2 5 8 1 3 2 1 4 3 7 5 8 9 1 5 7 7 9
B a s ic  d r u g s  a n d  p h a r m a c e u t ic a l s 3 5 2 2 4 1 7 7 .0 0 5 7 8 1 7 1 0 9 8 3 6 2 4 1 5 0 1 7 6 1 3 3 0 7 9 7
L e a th e r 3 2 3 1 5 2 8 6 .2 5 9 5 1 0 9 8 3 7 5 0 0 4 6 1 3 3 5 8 0 1
T O T A L 1 0 9 8 3 6 8 8 6 1 3 3 5 8 0 1
R a t io  o f  C A C  ( u n if o r m  a b a t e m e n t )  to  le a s t  c o s t  f o r  5 0 %  r e d u c t io n  in  T S P 2 .6 9
G u j a r a t
A b a t e m e n t  c o s t  f o r  T S P C u m u la t iv e T o t a l  a b a t e m e n t C u m u la t iv e  a b a t e m e n t
C P C B  c a t e g o r y I S I C ( R u p e e s /t o n ) T S P  lo a d  ( k i lo g r a m s ) T S P  lo a d  ( to n s ) c o s t  ( R u p e e s ) c o s t  ( R u p e e s )
C a u s t ic  s o d a 3 5 1 1 3 8 .9 0 5 6 0 1 0 5 6 0 .1 2 1 7 8 5 2 1 7 8 5
C e m e n t  ( u p to  5 0 %  c u m u la t iv e  a b a te m e n t) 3 6 9 2 2 0 8 .5 2 5 4 8 5 1 6 5 5 5 4 1 1 .7 1 1 4 3 7 6 1 9 1 1 4 5 9 4 0 5
C e m e n t  ( b e y o n d  5 0 %  c u m u la t iv e  a b a te m e n t) 3 6 9 2 2 0 8 .5 2 4 0 9 6 8 5 5 9 6 3 8 0 .3 8 5 4 2 7 2 7 2 0 0 0 2 1 3 2
O il  r e f in e r ie s 3 5 3 0 3 7 6 .8 5 2 2 4 9 4 6 9 8 6 2 9 .8 8 4 7 7 1 4 2 0 8 4 9 8 4 6
P u lp  a n d  p a p e r 3 4 1 1 6 5 3 .3 2 1 4 6 3 5 5 1 0 0 0 9 3 .3 9 5 6 1 6 5 2 1 8 0 6 0 1 0
S u g a r 3 1 1 8 9 2 2 .0 4 6 5 9 1 3 7 1 0 6 6 8 4 .7 6 0 7 7 4 8 1 2 7 8 8 3 4 9 1
F e r t i l i s e r 3 5 1 2 1 1 0 6 .6 7 6 2 5 8 8 1 0 7 3 1 0 .6 6 9 2 6 4 5 2 8 5 7 6 1 3 6
P e s t ic id e s 3 5 1 2 1 1 0 6 .6 7 6 5 8 6 8 1 0 7 9 6 9 .2 7 2 8 9 3 6 2 9 3 0 5 0 7 2
In te g r a te d  i r o n  a n d  s te e l 3 7 1 0 2 6 9 0 .9 0 1 7 5 0 4 2 1 0 9 7 1 9 .7 4 7 1 0 2 1 3 3 4 0 1 5 2 8 5
D is t i l l e r i e s 3 1 3 1 2 8 2 8 .7 3 0 1 0 9 7 1 9 .7 0 3 4 0 1 5 2 8 5
A lu m in iu m  s m e l te r 3 7 2 0 3 1 9 7 .9 9 0 1 0 9 7 1 9 .7 0 3 4 0 1 5 2 8 5
C o p p e r  s m e l te r 3 7 2 0 3 1 9 7 .9 9 0 1 0 9 7 1 9 .7 0 3 4 0 1 5 2 8 5
Z in c  s m e l te r 3 7 2 0 3 1 9 7 .9 9 0 1 0 9 7 1 9 .7 0 3 4 0 1 5 2 8 5
D y e s  a n d  d y e  in te r m e d ia te s 3 2 1 1 3 9 0 9 .7 3 9 8 4 2 9 1 1 0 7 0 4 .0 3 8 4 8 3 1 8 3 7 8 6 3 6 0 3
B a s ic  d r u g s  a n d  p h a r m a c e u t ic a l s 3 5 2 2 4 1 7 7 .0 0 1 1 7 2 3 1 1 0 8 2 1 .2 4 8 9 6 8 4 3 8 3 5 3 2 8 7
L e a th e r 3 2 3 1 5 2 8 6 .2 5 2 2 6 1 1 0 8 2 3 .5 1 1 9 4 5 3 8 3 6 5 2 3 2
T O T A L 1 1 0 8 2 3 4 6 3 8 3 6 5 2 3 2
R a t io  o f  C A C  ( u n if o r m  a b a t e m e n t )  to  le a s t  c o s t  f o r  5 0 %  r e d u c t io n  in  T S P 1 .6 7
 
 
 
  
 
Andhra Pradesh
Abatement cost for TSP Cumulative Total abatement Cumulative abatement
CPCB category ISIC (Rupees/ton) TSP load (kilograms) TSP load (tons) cost (Rupees) cost (Rupees)
Caustic soda 3511 38.90 37665 376.6 14650 14650
Cement (upto 50% cumulative abatement) 3692 208.52 4740825 47784.9 9885528 9900178
Cement (beyond 50% cumulative abatement) 3692 208.52 3068115 78466.0 6397607 16297785
Oil refineries 3530 376.85 86341 79329.5 325379 16623164
Pulp and paper 3411 653.32 246573 81795.2 1610906 18234069
Sugar 3118 922.04 676483 88560.0 6237413 24471482
Fertiliser 3512 1106.67 29709 88857.1 328783 24800265
Pesticides 3512 1106.67 20672 89063.8 228775 25029040
Integrated iron and steel 3710 2690.90 546854 94532.4 14715284 39744324
Distilleries 3131 2828.73 3138 94563.8 88767 39833091
Aluminium smelter 3720 3197.99 0 94563.8 0 39833091
Copper smelter 3720 3197.99 6054 94624.3 193607 40026698
Zinc smelter 3720 3197.99 84582 95470.1 2704912 42731610
Dyes and dye intermediates 3211 3909.73 0 95470.1 0 42731610
Basic drugs and pharmaceuticals 3522 4177.00 9945 95569.6 415393 43147003
Leather 3231 5286.25 17 95569.7 895 43147898
TOTAL 9556973 43147898
Ratio of CAC (uniform abatement) to least cost for 50%  reduction in TSP 2.18
Tamil Nadu
Abatement cost for TSP Cumulative Total abatement Cumulative abatement
CPCB category ISIC (Rupees/ton) TSP load (kilograms) TSP load (tons) cost (Rupees) cost (Rupees)
Caustic soda 3511 38.90 39291 392.9 15282 15282
Cement (upto 50% cumulative abatement) 3692 208.52 7055409 70947.0 14711879 14727161
Cement (beyond 50% cumulative abatement) 3692 208.52 5135546 122302.5 10708597 25435758
Oil refineries 3530 376.85 145162 123754.1 547046 25982803
Pulp and paper 3411 653.32 743320 131187.3 4856237 30839041
Sugar 3118 922.04 905868 140246.0 8352424 39191465
Fertiliser 3512 1106.67 19066 140436.6 210993 39402458
Pesticides 3512 1106.67 8553 140522.1 94652 39497110
Integrated iron and steel 3710 2690.90 66922 141191.4 1800789 41297899
Distilleries 3131 2828.73 22244 141413.8 629227 41927126
Aluminium smelter 3720 3197.99 0 141413.8 0 41927126
Copper smelter 3720 3197.99 0 141413.8 0 41927126
Zinc smelter 3720 3197.99 0 141413.8 0 41927126
Dyes and dye intermediates 3211 3909.73 865 141422.5 33812 41960938
Basic drugs and pharmaceuticals 3522 4177.00 24886 141671.3 1039478 43000416
Leather 3231 5286.25 22269 141894.0 1177196 44177612
TOTAL 14189400 44177612
Ratio of CAC (uniform abatement) to least cost for 50%  reduction in TSP 1.50
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Table 8 (continued) Uttar Pradesh
Abatement cost for TSP Cumulative Total abatement Cumulative abatement
CPCB category ISIC (Rupees/ton) TSP load (kilograms) TSP load (tons) cost (Rupees) cost (Rupees)
Caustic soda 3511 38.90 15943 159.4 6201 6201
Cement 3692 208.52 422204 4381.5 880377 886578
Oil refineries 3530 376.85 311230 7493.8 1172875 2059452
Pulp and paper 3411 653.32 265689 10150.7 1735794 3795247
Sugar (upto 50% cumulative abatement) 3118 922.04 1226150 22412.2 11305538 15100785
Sugar (beyond 50% cumulative abatement) 3118 922.04 1997947 42391.6 18421784 33522569
Fertiliser 3512 1106.67 146120 43852.8 1617064 35139633
Pesticides 3512 1106.67 1508 43867.9 16690 35156323
Integrated iron and steel 3710 2690.90 74969 44617.6 2017331 37173654
Distilleries 3131 2828.73 10177 44719.4 287878 37461532
Aluminium smelter 3720 3197.99 0 44719.4 0 37461532
Copper smelter 3720 3197.99 0 44719.4 0 37461532
Zinc smelter 3720 3197.99 703 44726.4 22496 37484029
Dyes and dye intermediates 3211 3909.73 29 44726.7 1145 37485174
Basic drugs and pharmaceuticals 3522 4177.00 3467 44761.4 144799 37629973
Leather 3231 5286.25 6298 44824.4 332930 37962902
TOTAL 4482435 37962902
Ratio of CAC (uniform abatement) to least cost for 50% reduction in TSP 1.26
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         Table 9.  Ratio of CAC to least cost abatement for 50% reduction in TSP load
Maharashtra 2.69
Gujarat 1.67
Andhra Pradesh 2.18
Tamil Nadu 1.50
Uttar Pradesh 1.26
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 Table 10.  Environmental standards for thermal power plants in India 
 
Process 
 
Environmental Parameter 
Concentration not to exceed in 
mg/litre (except for pH) 
Condenser cooling waters (once 
through cooling system) 
pH  
 
Temperature 
 
 
Free available chlorine 
6.5 - 8.5 
 
Not more than 5°C higher than 
intake water temperature 
 
0.5 
 
Boiler blowdowns Suspended solids 
 
Oil and grease 
 
Copper (total) 
 
Iron (total) 
100 
 
20 
 
1.0 
 
1.0 
 
Cooling tower blowdowns Free available chlorine 
 
Zinc 
 
Chromium (total) 
 
Phosphate 
 
Other corrosion inhibiting material 
0.5 
 
1.0 
 
0.2 
 
5.0 
 
Limit to be established on case 
by case basis by CPCB for Union 
Territories and SPCBs for states 
 
Ash pond effluent PH 
 
Suspended solids 
 
Oil and grease 
6.5-8.5 
 
100 
 
20 
 
Air emissions Particulate matter: 
 
(i)  ≥ 210 MW capacity 
(ii) < 210 MW capacity 
 
Sulphur dioxide: 
 
(i)   500 MW capacity 
(ii)  200/210 to 500 MW capacity 
(iii) < 200/210 MW capacity 
 
 
150 mg/m3 
350 mg/m3 
 
Stack height in metres 
 
275 
220 
H=14(Q)0.3  (Q - emission rate of 
SO2 in kg/hour) 
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      Table 11.  Estimates of annual health incidence in selected Indian cities
     due to ambient air pollution levels exceeding WHO guidelines
Premature deaths
Number Value ($)--lower bound Value ($)--upper bound
Mumbai 4,477 18,839,216 179,156,109
Nagpur 506 2,129,248 20,248,602
Pune 991 4,170,128 39,656,847
Maharashtra 5,974 25,138,592 239,061,558
Ahmedabad 2,979 12,535,632 119,210,643
Surat 1,488 6,261,504 59,545,296
Gujarat 4,467 18,797,136 178,755,939
Hyderabad 768 3,231,744 30,733,056
Andhra Pradesh 768 3,231,744 30,733,056
Chennai 863 3,631,504 34,534,671
Tamil Nadu 863 3,631,504 34,534,671
Agra 1,569 6,602,352 62,786,673
Kanpur 1,894 7,969,952 75,792,198
Varanasi 1,851 7,789,008 74,071,467
Uttar Pradesh 5,314 22,361,312 212,650,338
All 36 cities 40,351 169,797,008 1,614,725,967
Source: Brandon and Hommann (1995)
 
 
 34 
 
 Annex 1.  Applying appropriate conversion factors to IPPS and ASI data 
to arrive at pollution load and abatement costs 
 
In the IPPS: 
1. Pollution intensities (emission factors) are in kilograms per US$ million at 1987 prices. 
2. Abatement cost coefficients (cost per ton abated) are in US$ per ton abated at 1994 prices. 
 
The Annual Survey of Industry (ASI) output data is in thousand rupees at current (1997-98) prices.  The Indian 
financial year (FY) runs from April 1 to 31 March.  All data are reported by FY.  We assume calendar year t = 
FY t - t+1, e.g., calendar 1987 = FY 1987-88. 
 
The following steps are used in calculating pollution loads: 
1. Convert IPPS pollution intensities to Indian rupees (INR).  In 1987-88, INR 12.966 = US$ 1. (Source: 
Economic Survey 2000-2001 Table 6.5 http://www.indiabudget.nic.in/es2000-01/).  So, dividing 
pollution intensity by 12,966 gives us kilograms (of SO2, NO2, etc.) per thousand INR in 1987-88. 
 
2. Deflate ASI output data to 1987-88 prices.  We use the official wholesale price index (WPI) for the 
manufacturing sub group.  A problem that arises is that the base year for WPI was changed effective 
April 1, 2000 from 1981-82 = 100 to 1993-94 = 100.  (See http://eaindustry.nic.in/pib.htm for details).  
A linking factor of 2.43 is used to convert WPI for 1997-98 to 1987-88 because manufacturing group 
WPI (average of weeks) under old series in 1993-94 was 243.  See Table 5.1 of Economic Survey 
2000-2001 op. cit.  Thus, 
1987-88 manufactured products WPI (1981-82 base) = 139 
1997-98 manufactured products WPI (1993-94 base) = 128 
 
So we use [139 / (128 ∗ 2.43)] = 0.44688878 as the deflator. 
 
3. Convert IPPS abatement cost coefficients to INR at 1987-88 prices. 
 
(i) First, multiply IPPS figure by 31.399 (in 1994-95, INR 31.399 = US$ 1, Economic 
Survey Table 6.5, op. cit.) to arrive at rupees per ton abated in 1994-95 prices. 
(ii) Then deflate using steps similar to (2) above to arrive at 1987-88 prices.  Thus, 
1987-88 WPI manufacturing (1981-82 base) = 139 
1994-95 WPI manufacturing (1993-94 base) = 112 
 
So we use [139 / (112 ∗ 2.43)] = 0.5107289 as the deflator. 
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